mirror of
https://github.com/SickGear/SickGear.git
synced 2024-12-26 20:53:38 +00:00
159 lines
5.7 KiB
Python
159 lines
5.7 KiB
Python
"""The match_hostname() function from Python 3.5, essential when using SSL."""
|
|
|
|
# Note: This file is under the PSF license as the code comes from the python
|
|
# stdlib. http://docs.python.org/3/license.html
|
|
# It is modified to remove commonName support.
|
|
|
|
from __future__ import annotations
|
|
|
|
import ipaddress
|
|
import re
|
|
import typing
|
|
from ipaddress import IPv4Address, IPv6Address
|
|
|
|
if typing.TYPE_CHECKING:
|
|
from .ssl_ import _TYPE_PEER_CERT_RET_DICT
|
|
|
|
__version__ = "3.5.0.1"
|
|
|
|
|
|
class CertificateError(ValueError):
|
|
pass
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _dnsname_match(
|
|
dn: typing.Any, hostname: str, max_wildcards: int = 1
|
|
) -> typing.Match[str] | None | bool:
|
|
"""Matching according to RFC 6125, section 6.4.3
|
|
|
|
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3
|
|
"""
|
|
pats = []
|
|
if not dn:
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
# Ported from python3-syntax:
|
|
# leftmost, *remainder = dn.split(r'.')
|
|
parts = dn.split(r".")
|
|
leftmost = parts[0]
|
|
remainder = parts[1:]
|
|
|
|
wildcards = leftmost.count("*")
|
|
if wildcards > max_wildcards:
|
|
# Issue #17980: avoid denials of service by refusing more
|
|
# than one wildcard per fragment. A survey of established
|
|
# policy among SSL implementations showed it to be a
|
|
# reasonable choice.
|
|
raise CertificateError(
|
|
"too many wildcards in certificate DNS name: " + repr(dn)
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# speed up common case w/o wildcards
|
|
if not wildcards:
|
|
return bool(dn.lower() == hostname.lower())
|
|
|
|
# RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 1.
|
|
# The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier in which
|
|
# the wildcard character comprises a label other than the left-most label.
|
|
if leftmost == "*":
|
|
# When '*' is a fragment by itself, it matches a non-empty dotless
|
|
# fragment.
|
|
pats.append("[^.]+")
|
|
elif leftmost.startswith("xn--") or hostname.startswith("xn--"):
|
|
# RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 3.
|
|
# The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier
|
|
# where the wildcard character is embedded within an A-label or
|
|
# U-label of an internationalized domain name.
|
|
pats.append(re.escape(leftmost))
|
|
else:
|
|
# Otherwise, '*' matches any dotless string, e.g. www*
|
|
pats.append(re.escape(leftmost).replace(r"\*", "[^.]*"))
|
|
|
|
# add the remaining fragments, ignore any wildcards
|
|
for frag in remainder:
|
|
pats.append(re.escape(frag))
|
|
|
|
pat = re.compile(r"\A" + r"\.".join(pats) + r"\Z", re.IGNORECASE)
|
|
return pat.match(hostname)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _ipaddress_match(ipname: str, host_ip: IPv4Address | IPv6Address) -> bool:
|
|
"""Exact matching of IP addresses.
|
|
|
|
RFC 9110 section 4.3.5: "A reference identity of IP-ID contains the decoded
|
|
bytes of the IP address. An IP version 4 address is 4 octets, and an IP
|
|
version 6 address is 16 octets. [...] A reference identity of type IP-ID
|
|
matches if the address is identical to an iPAddress value of the
|
|
subjectAltName extension of the certificate."
|
|
"""
|
|
# OpenSSL may add a trailing newline to a subjectAltName's IP address
|
|
# Divergence from upstream: ipaddress can't handle byte str
|
|
ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ipname.rstrip())
|
|
return bool(ip.packed == host_ip.packed)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def match_hostname(
|
|
cert: _TYPE_PEER_CERT_RET_DICT | None,
|
|
hostname: str,
|
|
hostname_checks_common_name: bool = False,
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
"""Verify that *cert* (in decoded format as returned by
|
|
SSLSocket.getpeercert()) matches the *hostname*. RFC 2818 and RFC 6125
|
|
rules are followed, but IP addresses are not accepted for *hostname*.
|
|
|
|
CertificateError is raised on failure. On success, the function
|
|
returns nothing.
|
|
"""
|
|
if not cert:
|
|
raise ValueError(
|
|
"empty or no certificate, match_hostname needs a "
|
|
"SSL socket or SSL context with either "
|
|
"CERT_OPTIONAL or CERT_REQUIRED"
|
|
)
|
|
try:
|
|
# Divergence from upstream: ipaddress can't handle byte str
|
|
#
|
|
# The ipaddress module shipped with Python < 3.9 does not support
|
|
# scoped IPv6 addresses so we unconditionally strip the Zone IDs for
|
|
# now. Once we drop support for Python 3.9 we can remove this branch.
|
|
if "%" in hostname:
|
|
host_ip = ipaddress.ip_address(hostname[: hostname.rfind("%")])
|
|
else:
|
|
host_ip = ipaddress.ip_address(hostname)
|
|
|
|
except ValueError:
|
|
# Not an IP address (common case)
|
|
host_ip = None
|
|
dnsnames = []
|
|
san: tuple[tuple[str, str], ...] = cert.get("subjectAltName", ())
|
|
key: str
|
|
value: str
|
|
for key, value in san:
|
|
if key == "DNS":
|
|
if host_ip is None and _dnsname_match(value, hostname):
|
|
return
|
|
dnsnames.append(value)
|
|
elif key == "IP Address":
|
|
if host_ip is not None and _ipaddress_match(value, host_ip):
|
|
return
|
|
dnsnames.append(value)
|
|
|
|
# We only check 'commonName' if it's enabled and we're not verifying
|
|
# an IP address. IP addresses aren't valid within 'commonName'.
|
|
if hostname_checks_common_name and host_ip is None and not dnsnames:
|
|
for sub in cert.get("subject", ()):
|
|
for key, value in sub:
|
|
if key == "commonName":
|
|
if _dnsname_match(value, hostname):
|
|
return
|
|
dnsnames.append(value)
|
|
|
|
if len(dnsnames) > 1:
|
|
raise CertificateError(
|
|
"hostname %r "
|
|
"doesn't match either of %s" % (hostname, ", ".join(map(repr, dnsnames)))
|
|
)
|
|
elif len(dnsnames) == 1:
|
|
raise CertificateError(f"hostname {hostname!r} doesn't match {dnsnames[0]!r}")
|
|
else:
|
|
raise CertificateError("no appropriate subjectAltName fields were found")
|